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The ‘Warriors Break’: Muslim Ceasefire beyond strategic pause  
Abstract  
Ceasefires are a difficult thing to achieve. No more so than in the conflicts of the Middle 
East. Without ceasefires civilians caught in wars remain vulnerable. As recent events in the 
Middle East have demonstrated though ceasefires are difficult to negotiate and are far more 
likely to breakdown than succeed. When it comes to the notion of negotiating ceasefires 
with Islamist groups in particular there is a widely held belief in Western policy-making 
circles that the tasks is even harder if not impossible. This is because such counterparts are 
frequently viewed as holding absolutist goals and positions which are entirely incompatible 
with peace-making. In this article I present analysis of one such group the Palestinian Hamas 
movement. I find evidence that far from seeking to prolong conflict Hamas has offered 
ceasefires and calms on repeated occasions to Israel.  This article contends that the 
willingness of Hamas, however, is circumscribed by the context of conflict and its other 
actors as well as the unwillingness of mediators and negotiations to explore inclusion of 
such groups into the political process.  
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Introduction  
Ten years after Palestinians freely elected Hamas to power in the West Bank and Gaza Strip 
prospects for peace between Israel and the Palestinians have only worsened. The 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict, as is increasingly the case elsewhere in the Middle East, multi-
dimensional and protracted. Islamist groups, like Hamas have come to play a fundamental 
part in the conflict dynamic.  Their role is also key determinant in peace-making.1 Many 
though contend the Hamas is a force for conflict not peace.2   
                                                          
1 Milton-Edwards and Farrell, Hamas 
2 Gunning, “Peace”; Stedman, “Spoiler” 
3 
 
In this article we explore the extent to which mechanisms for peace-making such as a 
ceasefire are helpful in understanding whether a group like Hamas is interested in peace or 
only conflict. We explore the populist Western consensus that groups such as Hamas are 
embarked on a terroristic trajectory and nihilistic criminality and defiant in the face of 
attempts at peace-making.3  
The purpose of this article is to address this issue, and provide analysis on Islamists and 
what might be called peace overtures of truce and ceasefire by examining Hamas. The 
research is particularly relevant for peace-keeping and peace-building literatures because 
truce and ceasefires can be a key factor in transforming pauses in war or violence conflict to 
negotiated peace.4 Yet we contend that the utility of ceasefires5 for purposes of confidence-
building and negotiation for peace settlements are circumscribed.  The reduction of the 
hudna into a tactical pause has become a default outcome of the manner in which others 
respond to and deal Hamas and its demands – whether they are made politically through 
performance at the ballot box or down the barrel of a gun.   
In this article the terms ‘warriors break’ or ‘tactical pause’ refer to an operational halt in 
hostilities so as to re-group, review strategy and address anew conflict. With respect to 
Hamas these ceasefires or pauses arise out of decision-making processes within the 
leadership of the entire movement rather than operational field decisions by commanders 
of Hamas’s armed wing.6  For state actors like Israel or the US groups like Hamas are 
perceived as incapable of a halt in violent conflict for any other reason than to rearm and re-
group. They see such offers from Hamas as only a tactical operational pause. Other reasons 
for a ceasefire as it may relate to negotiation or building for reconciliation or peace are 
perceived as inconceivable.7   
                                                          
3 Perry and Negrin, Theory and practice 
4 Fortna, Peacetime 
5 These ceasefires are known in Arabic as hudna or pauses in conflict tahdiyeh 
6 The military wing of Hamas is known as the Izz-a-din al-Qassam Brigades  
7 Beaty, Effects  
4 
 
Working against such contentions the Hamas leadership have, as this article goes to show, 
have not only offered ceasefires on repeated occasions but been willing to leverage a 
ceasefire beyond a tactical pause towards a negotiated and more sustainable resolution of 
the conflict. In this respect, however, such signals have been stymied by political 
competitors and adversaries alike. The failures or unwillingness of other actors, including 
powerful mediators such as the US, to use ceasefires as an opportunity to pursue conflict 
management and peace-building has further undermined their usefulness for negotiation 
and wider conflict resolution.  
The opportunity to explore the potentiality of ceasefires in relation to Islamist groups, 
occupying state forces and international mediators speaks to a number of ongoing conflicts 
in the Middle East. Indeed, attempts to initiate truce agreements, temporary pauses in 
conflicts and long-term ceasefires as a step to negotiated resolution of these complex 
conflicts has never been more urgent.  The collapse or absence of such initiatives has 
attendant consequences for the stability of the wider region.    
Explaining Hamas’s motivation in signing up to ceasefires is subject to contested and varied 
interpretations. The decision to engage is explained according to a number of competing 
explanations: prosaic resource mobilization and political opportunity, strategic military 
realities in relation to the movement’s relative weakness at the time particularly with 
respect to Israel’s ongoing measures against the Palestinians, intra-group competition with 
the PLO, political bidding and legitimacy, defining and redefining resistance. What is largely 
absent from such rationalizations of Hamas discourse on this matter is reference to 
theological positioning on hudna.  
Additionally, the research is particularly relevant, because it examines the opportunities and 
constraints within Islamist groups for ceasefire. It also highlights that a ceasefire is not 
sufficient in and of itself to move conflicts from violence to peace.  Thus, as policymakers 
and diplomats ponder the challenges of mediation and negotiation of multi-dimensional and 
prolonged conflicts, this article helps ascertain the limitations of state and non-state actors 
alike. While some conclusions of this article can only be specific to this case, the findings 
may also be relevant to other multi-dimensional conflicts in the Middle East. This is 
especially the case where Islamist actors are part of violent conflicts. This is because of the 
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dominance of particular discourses of distrust of Islamism in Western policy-making circles. 
This leaves them predisposed against Islamists and the possibilities of negotiating ceasefires 
for peace.  
Debating the discourse to cease fire  
Many contributions to the discourse on peace-building address the importance of a 
ceasefire in foundations for peace between state and non-state armed actors or resistance 
groups.8 In the wake of the Cold War and with the explosion of new ethno-national conflicts 
scholars were concerned to examine the potentiality of ceasefires not only for the 
management but the negotiated resolution of conflicts.9 There was also an emerging 
consensus that to halt a conflict in this way addressed an important humanitarian 
dimension in environments where civilian casualty rates and disruption to society was 
greatest.10 Such literatures also recognise that cease-fires can be delicate and subject to 
repeated breakdown and conflict resumption.11 The role of mediators and negotiators has 
also been identified as an important element of such approaches particularly as they relate 
to timing, persuasion and promotion of cease-fire beyond a halt to violence.12  
From the standpoint of much western literature ceasefire timing is also considered to have 
an important effect on negotiations which create political thresholds for conflict resolution 
and peace.13 A strategy of intervention by outside parties to establish a ceasefire is 
recommended once violence has passed its fever pitch and as part of the peace settlement 
process.14 This has given rise to critiques that focus on the short-lived efficacy of such 
approaches and endogenous drivers of original conflict causes and the difficulties which 
third parties encounter in such processes.15 As has been argued in contexts as diverse as 
Northern Ireland, Afghanistan and DRC ceasefires in such circumstance can give parties to 
                                                          
8 DeSoto,  “Ending violent conflict”; Zartman, “Mediation”  
9 Touval, “Ethical Dilemmas “; Hauss, International Conflict 
10 In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, civilian casualty rates on both sides are higher than 
military ones (http://www.btselem.org/statistics). 
11 Fortna, Peacetime 
12 Touval, “Ethical Dilemmas “; Zartman, Peacemaking in international 
13 Darby and McGinty, Contemporary Peacemaking ; Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall, 
Contemporary Conflict 
14 Crocker, Taming Intractable Conflicts 
15 Reid, “Finding a Peace”;  Bercovitch and Gartner, “Overcoming Obstacles” 
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the cessation of hostilities time to rearm and recalibrate their goals leading not only to 
resumption of hostilities but rising death tolls.16 Crocker, for example, contends that such 
pauses in conflicts lead to “muscle-flexing on both sides, adding to the conflict’s already 
massive scar tissue of distrust”.17 He thus argues that unless intimately tied to a political 
settlement process such ceasefires have limited utility and can even aggravate conflict. Such 
a perspective identifies the command within violence for otherwise disempowered political 
actors. It acknowledges the dynamic of violence as power in contesting legitimacy in fragile 
societies and broken states.18   
Hamas: a dimension of modern martial Islam? 
 Hamas – the Islamic Resistance Movement - proves a useful case study in this discussion. 
Hamas, founded in 1987, is typified in most academic literature as a broad political-socio 
movement that is also engaged in sustained conflict with the state of Israel as occupier of 
Muslim waqf territory.19 Hamas is also a rival and competitor to factions of the Palestinian 
secular national movement, specifically Fatah.  The rising popularity of the movement can 
be attributed, at least in part, to the perceived failures of Fatah within the political 
framework of the Oslo peace process to bring a lasting peace settlement, and dissatisfaction 
at its control of the institutions of the Palestinian Authority (PA).20  
 
Some studies depict Hamas as primarily a terrorist organization with all other activities 
subsumed.21 Hamas’s interpretation of particular Muslim motifs, it has been contended, is 
ideologically predisposed to jihad of a particular kind.22 Major contemporary Muslim 
scholars such as Sheikh Yusuf Qaradawi have reinforced this dimension of the context in 
which Hamas wages jihad against Israel as a foreign occupier and usurper of Muslim lands.23 
                                                          
16 Crocker, Taming Intractable Conflicts; Zartman, Peacemaking in international 
17 Crocker, Taming Intractable Conflicts 158 
18 Arendt, On violence 
19 Milton-Edwards and Farrell, Hamas; Abu Amr, “Hamas: A Historical “; Mishal and Sela, The 
Palestinian Hamas; Chehab, Hamas: The Untold Story;  Cardici, Hamas From Resistance 
20 Milton-Edwards, Islamic Politics; Usher, “The democratic resistance “; Baconi, “The 
demise of Oslo” 
21 Levitt, Hamas: Politics ; Schanzer, Hamas versus Fatah 
22 Wagemakers, “Legitimizing pragmatism”; Al-Shaer, “Islam in the narrative” 
23 Qaradawi, Fiqh al-Jihad 
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Irrespective of such dispositions the leadership within Hamas – which constitutes wings 
including the military, political leadership internally and externally as well as prison leaders - 
reveals a dynamic debate and discourse in respect of key positions on resistance, violence 
and its cessation.  
Indeed, since its inception much of the Hamas’ discourse, including its own charter (mithaq), 
statements and communiqués, evidences engagement with such themes. There has also 
been an ongoing dialogue within Hamas about ceasefire with different elements of the 
movement holding opposing and varying views on the topic. Hamas’s opponents, however, 
point to documents like the charter to highlight examples of a discourse within the 
movement that reflects a singular violent predisposition and aversion to peace.  
In reality the charter emerged as a historic document from a specific context and time when 
the movement was first founded in the late 1980s. Hamas leaders and scholars have since 
contended that elements of the charter are flexible and have changed in emphasis or have 
become irrelevant over time.24 In more recent years there is certainly evidence that 
Hamas’s discourse has changed by means of expressing the ways in which, for example, 
resistance is strategically ordered – primarily in terms of how armed resistance is 
emphasised and expanded to include other forms of popular and even non-violent 
resistance.25 For example, in the wake of the Hamas electoral victory in 2006 and 
international debate about politically accommodating Hamas its leader Khaled Meshal 
(whom Israeli tried to assassinate in 1997) signalled a discursive position on what was 
meant by resistance declaring it to have a “political and diplomatic” form.26 There is 
evidence, therefore, of ongoing engagement with concept of resistance and its armed 
dimensions including the point at which arms could be laid down.  Yet what was clearly less 
developed from the point of Hamas’s inception was the debate about the strategic 
                                                          
24 Tamimi, Hamas: A History, 150-1 
25 Milton-Edwards, “Hamas and the Arab” 
26 Meshal, “Interview” 
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management of conflict including the application or utility of ceasefire (hudna)27or calm 
(tahdiyah). This would come later as the movement grew, expanded and developed.  
One of the ways in which Hamas, at this point in its early evolution, was defining its position 
in relation to its enemy (Israel) was in terms of the religious legitimacy bestowed and 
accrued to its cause by defining its violence against Israel as jihad. This also allowed it to 
draw a distinction against their fedayi rivals in Fatah. Israel was deemed an illegitimate 
entity and occupier by Hamas. Hamas wasn’t just a resistance organization (like the PLO) but 
it was an Islamic resistance organization and hence obliged (fard ayn) to engage in jihad.  
Hamas perceived resistance as a Muslim duty “the day that enemies usurp part of Moslem 
land, Jihad becomes the individual duty of every Moslem.”28 As such jihad was initially 
defined by them according to some of the classic norms of war in Islam, including important 
injunctions against targeting civilians.29  
By and large Hamas initially defined its position around those Koranic passages and previous 
historical instances in Muslim history such as Salah Eddin’s war against the Crusader 
occupation of Jerusalem which allowed for war to be waged under specific circumstances. 
As with the Koran, Hamas defined its early position as one of defined and limited warfare 
rather than limitless terror and violence.30 Hamas began to give ideological import to certain 
dimensions of fiqh31 on jihad with far-reaching consequences for the ways in which it 
signified itself and was signified by others.32 It is also apparent that Hamas omitted those 
passages of Koranic, religious literature and history which addressed overtures of 
                                                          
27 By hudna here we are referring to the classical Islamic term of a long-term truce between 
Muslims and their enemies. The enemy here can be both internal (a fellow Muslim) or 
external.  In the period beginning in 628 C.E. the Prophet Mohammad called for a ten-year 
ceasefire, known as the Truce of Hudaybieh, with his enemies from the Quraysh tribe. 
During the hudna the two sides were to live in peace. 
28 Hamas, Covenant,  Article 15 
29 Peters, Jihad in classical ; Ghannoushi 2008 
30 Milton-Edwards, Islamic Politics 
31 Jurisprudence  
32 Malik, “Jihad and its development” 
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reconciliation, the cessation of hostilities and conclusion of peace (sulh) which would 
require ceasefires and negotiation with the enemy.   
Transition  
During 1990s there is evidence that the Hamas leadership engaged in a transition regarding 
their position on the management of conflict with Israel and with their fellow Palestinians – 
particularly the PLO’s major Fatah faction. We see this with respect to ceasefires. For 
example, during the Oslo peace process Hamas leaders, including one of its founders Sheikh 
Yassin went on public record with an endorsement of ceasefire.33 This was followed in 2002 
– during the second Intifada - with a serious commitment by the Hamas leadership to 
debating ceasefire. A year later they participated in a unilateral ceasefire alongside other 
Palestinian factions.34 This reflects the emergence within Hamas of a serious discourse 
among leaders and cadres on ceasefire and other mechanisms for strategic management of 
conflict including its implementation, demands for reciprocation, monitoring and 
enforcement. A decade later, Hamas would engage in similar debates and decision-making 
over the practice of a pause or ‘calm’ (tahdiyah) in hostilities with their enemies principally 
Israel.  
Returning to the issue of ceasefire the leadership of Hamas appear to have introduced the 
idea of a ceasefire as a twofold mechanism. Firstly, they used it for the purposes of tactical 
management of the conflict with Israel. Secondly as a political entry point to negotiation of 
the conflict. Tactical management is as a hudna as limited by a timeframe (according to 
Islamic tradition), “Islam permits a temporary truce for a limited period of time with the 
Jewish enemy if necessary,” stated Sheikh Yassin.35 Secondly although the leadership at this 
point appeared to be offering no compromise in its position regarding the resolution of the 
conflict with Israel it was signalling a desire to political entry. Coupled to this discourse on 
hudna was also an implicit recognition by the Hamas leadership of Israel, delimited by the 
                                                          
33 Yassin, “Interviews”; Tamimi, Hamas: A History: 158 
34 EI, “Full texts of the Palestinian” 
35 Yassin, Author interview 
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1967 borders, and evidence was later to emerge of an important negotiation or dialogue 
dimension to conduct between Hamas and Israel.36  
Creating and redefining hudna   
When the second Palestinian Intifada broke out in September 2000 it was marked by an 
unprecedented escalation of violence on both sides.37 The extent to which civilians were 
disproportionately caught in violence also exerted pressures to seek ways to manage the 
conflict better and reduce casualty rates. This included exhortations to break the “cycle of 
violence” by the UN and proposals by external actors such as the US in terms of the 2001 
Tenet Palestinian-Israeli Security Implementation Workplan and 2002 Zinni Ceasefire plan 
which called for comprehensive ceasefire.38 The extent to which the reduction of such 
violence could be perceived as an overture for peace was difficult to discern during this 
phase.  Palestinian groups like Hamas grappled internally with the implications of 
introducing such a mechanism into their remit. Israel, and its supporters, largely dismissed 
arguments that Hamas’s position on a ceasefire could mean anything other than a tactical 
pause in the conflict to re-arm and re-group against Israel.  
 
Over the course of history ceasefire has been a flexible instrument employed by Islamic 
armed actors.39 In the case of Hamas – a non-state armed actor under protracted Israeli 
occupation - a similar flexible approach appears to emerge in the thinking of the leadership 
during the period of the second Palestinian Intifada (2000-05). The leadership sought to 
balance the fundamental rhetoric and raison d’être of jihad as well as appear to calibrate or 
offer to engage in a unilateral ceasefire.40 Hamas debate also focussed on the issue of the 
permissibility of targeting of Israeli civilians, particularly in suicide attacks.  Tamimi contends 
that some of the Hamas leadership argued that this kind of targeting was an “aberration”.41 
Other leaders argued that Israeli civilians could be attacked. For example, Hamas leader Dr 
                                                          
36 Tamimi, Hamas: A History:156-9 
37 Milton-Edwards and Farrell, Hamas 
38 Eiland, “The IDF in the Second”; Shikaki, “Palestinians divided” 
39 Holt, “Qalāwūn's Treaty “; Holt, “The Treaties”;  Hroub, HAMAS: 55 
40 Pape, Dying to win 
41 Tamimi, Hamas: A History:165 
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Mahmoud Zahar asserted that “if Israelis are killing Palestinian civilians then why we are not 
using the same means? An eye for an eye … None of them are civilians … they say they are a 
military society and in civil uniform.”42  Hamas’s offer of hudna was thus made, according to 
their leaders, within a specific timeframe and without concessions such as ‘recognition’ of 
the enemy.  
 
As noted above Hamas’s actual participation in a ceasefire was first apparent in the 
initiatives of 2001-03 and included them as one among other Palestinian national factions. 
The ceasefire was a unilateral step by Palestinians and was not part of a negotiated or 
reciprocated agreement with Israel. It was a decision by Hamas (and other factions) to stop 
armed attacks on Israel. It was also part of a call on the international community to 
persuade Israel into meeting Palestinian demands to not only stop violence against 
Palestinians (specifically targeted assassinations), but to release prisoners and detainees, to 
halt illegal settlement activity, and to protect Christian and Muslim holy places as well (New 
York Times, 2003). An additional and interesting dynamic was that this also required Hamas 
and the PLO (mainly Fatah) to negotiate with each other over the terms of a ceasefire offer 
to Israel revealing the internal tensions and competing objectives between the two rival 
movements.  
Authors like Gunning highlight local political developments, including changes within the 
Palestinian factional milieu as it related to Hamas’s power and legitimacy, to explain the 
dynamic in terms of religious interpretation of hudna. Here Hamas is portrayed in a fashion 
almost identical to secular nationalist factions in the Palestinian milieu.43  Its religious 
character is emptied of meaning. This despite the specific employment of a portentous 
Islamic term: hudna.  
In the Palestinian context the application of hudna for nationalist purposes by armed 
factions such as the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades (Fatah’s military wing) and the mapping out 
and commitment of leftist radical factions of the PFLP and DFLP also contributed to the 
reinterpretation and ownership of the hudna. This made it increasingly more difficult for the 
                                                          
42 Zahar, Author interview 
43 Gunning, Hamas in Politics: 222-3 
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concept to be viewed primarily from a historico-religious lens or for Hamas to claim it for 
itself alone.   
In contrast to Gunning Hroub contends that Hamas “bound by its religious roots ... felt the 
need to justify its adoption of a controversial policy [a hudna] on Islamic religious 
grounds”.44 It was reasoned that if fiqh of jihad had been employed to justify violent attack 
against Israel then fiqh limiting or ceasing such violent attacks was necessary to preserve the 
movement’s Islamist character.  Hardliners within the movement remained sceptical of a 
ceasefire and this was indicative in statements from leaders such as Abdel Aziz Rantissi: “as 
long as we are under occupation we have to continue fighting until we finish this mission. 
The formula is not cease-fire because we are not two states facing each other across a 
border. We are under occupation and we are defending ourselves. So the word ceasefire is 
not working here but resistance and occupation. They should stop occupation and then we 
will stop resistance”.45  
Political objectives 
Hamas’s experience of negotiating the June 2003 hudna also revealed that they would 
determine their position on strategic political objectives linked to their rivalry (and later 
enmity) with Fatah. Here, we argue, the discourse on jihad, hudna and avoidance of fitnah 
(internal chaos) was more ambiguous. Nevertheless Hamas leaders argued that for the sake 
of unity against their common enemy (Israel) and to avoid internal strife (fitnah) with Fatah 
agreement over a ceasefire was possible. This reveals a flexibility and pragmatic political 
utility to ceasefire in terms of internal conflicts involving rivalry between a local Islamist and 
nationalist actors.   
Hamas leader Ismail Abu Shanab, who was a key figure in promoting the ceasefire mechanism 
explained the import of unity declaring that, “first of all we want to ... find common ground 
with other groups and leave our differences aside. That’s the golden rule. The common 
ground is: Intifada, resisting the occupation, developing better Palestinian life and reform and 
developing a Palestinian state and struggling towards the return of the refugees. Those are 
                                                          
44 Hroub,  HAMAS: 55 
45 Rantissi, Author interview 
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the main targets on the document that we tried to establish”.46 Internal unity, of the kind 
addressed in the ceasefire to which the Palestinian factions signed up in June 2003 was a way 
in which the goal of protection from a foreign occupier and unity to confront that particular 
foe could be better achieved. This was a goal that Hamas could sign up to.  
 
It is contended, therefore, that the first hudna unilaterally declared by the Palestinians 
addressed Hamas’s fundamental concern to present itself as Islamist and legitimate both in 
terms of Israel to whom it had declared a jihad against and its Palestinian nationalist rivals 
with whom it should avoid internal chaos or civil war with. More generally Palestinian 
supporters of Hamas also reacted positively to the declaration. This constructive reaction 
signalled that those who had feared that a Hamas ceasefire would gravely weaken popular 
support if it appeared to abandon jihad could be mistaken.  
Some supporters of Hamas, however, remained unconvinced that a ceasefire would provide 
sufficient political dividends compared to those wrought against Israel from armed violence. 
This established a tension in terms of political and military leaders or hardliners and 
moderates in the movement though these terms were not always mutually exclusive. 
Nevertheless, such hardliners (including Izz-a-din al-Qassam Brigade commanders) 
respected the outcome of decision-making processes and played a significant part in 
disciplining and enforcing truces on the ground. Even when Israeli attacked Gaza in the 
summer of 2014 and commanders of the Izz-a-din al-Qassam Brigades wanted to continue 
the fight they abided by the decisions of their political leadership negotiating a new 
ceasefire in Cairo.  
The Hamas political leadership, in particular, has always tacitly recognised that a political 
outcome was inevitable in the conflict with Israel. Moreover there were elements of the 
Hamas leadership that believed that a hudna would set the stage for negotiations and 
signalled ideological pragmatism.47  It was a signal, however, that was regarded with deep 
suspicion by other actors. Israel was disbelieving, with the argument circulated that Hamas’s 
commitment to hudna was tactical, “merely inducing Hamas to stop attacks through a 
                                                          
46 Abu Shanab, Author interview 
47 Hatina, “Hamas and the Oslo”:37 
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hudna or truce is not acceptable, since Hamas will simply wait to fight again another day 
while keeping its capabilities intact”.48  
The ceasefires of the second intifada period were largely a failure. Unilateral acts designed 
to achieve a pause in hostilities only lasted for short periods, Israeli reciprocation was 
limited and its military forces still continued to attack Palestinians and politically its 
leadership reinforced its practices of occupation.49 The causes of the breakdown of the 
earlier ceasefires remain a source of debate. A number of lessons, however, were drawn. 
Hamas leaders concluded that unilateral hudna would not draw Israeli reciprocation. Some 
in the leadership of Hamas were unwilling to undertake further unilateral ceasefires 
because they disbelieved Israel’s intentions contending that Israeli violence was still 
perpetrated against Palestinians. All the same the challenge of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
at that time lay in how Hamas would remain responsive to its popular constituency and 
compete against its secular national rivals if there was a demand that armed attacks and 
violence against Israel be reduced or halted as a means to alleviate Palestinian suffering.  By 
June 2003, for example, 73% of Palestinians wanted a ceasefire.50 One way Hamas 
responded to this was to change the language around hudna including the introduction of 
new semantics in terms of the ceasefire lexicon.   
A Calm (before the storm)  
From 2003-5 Israeli-Palestinian cycles of violence continued but Hamas also reduced suicide 
attacks and it became evident that it would instead launch rockets at Israel. The hope of 
another hudna seemed remote but as Hamas sought to capitalise on domestic political 
opportunities to challenge the hegemonic institutional hold of Fatah over the PA it 
announced it would participate in a pause /period of tahdiyah.  
The predominance of political over military and religious steams within the movement 
created new opportunities to consider a pause or period of ‘calm’ and on this occasion 
would create an opportunity for Hamas to participate in Palestinian local elections and play 
                                                          
48 Ganor, “Countering Hamas” 
49 Milton-Edwards and Crooke, “Elusive ingredient” 
50 PSR, Opinion Poll 
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a part in facilitating the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza. In March 2005 President Abbas 
announced a tahdiyah which Hamas agreed to abide by. On this occasion Hamas leaders 
were specific that they would agree to conditions that constituted ‘calm’ rather than a 
ceasefire (hudna). Hamas leader Khaled Meshal argued that the move to reduce violence 
against Israel was an entirely legitimate element of maintaining the resistance.51  
The tahdiyah lasted for more than a year and in that time Hamas capitalised on the 
opportunity to contest Palestinian local and (and for the first time) legislative elections 
against its main rival in Fatah.52 The political gain was apparent but weighed against wider 
ideological factors created tension within the movement as hardliners complained of a 
degree of capitulation in terms of resistance against Israel and salafi-jihadi elements such as 
al-Qaeda scorned and critiqued Hamas. By contesting for power in the local arena through 
elections Hamas abided by its own undertakings to desist from violent attacks against Israel. 
Once again the Hamas leadership demonstrated how it could engender discipline and 
enforcement of such decisions over the entire movement, including the Izz-a-din al-Qassam 
Brigades. Hamas gained from its decision to halt violence against Israel as it was left 
relatively unhindered by Israel during this period to freely campaign and compete for votes. 
The outcome of the elections, though a surprise, created the opportunity for Hamas to 
achieve political power; Hamas won 74 of the 132 seats in the Palestinian legislature and 
many Palestinian municipalities also became dominated by them.53  
Once elected to power its leadership initially indicated that the possibility of a long-term 
truce (hudna) could be back on the agenda and that it was prepared to negotiate on such 
terms. Khaled Meshal declared to Israel, “If you are willing to accept the principle of a long-
term truce, we are prepared to negotiate the terms. Hamas is extending a hand of peace to 
those who are truly interested in a peace based on justice”.54 This scenario, however, was 
dependent on the reactions of other actors to Hamas’ democratic victory and the ways in 
which the offer of a ceasefire was perceived and understood. Israel continued to reject such 
offers and contended that they were nothing more than rhetorical statements as Hamas 
                                                          
51 Meshal, “Interview, Al Ahram” 
52 Milton-Edwards and Farrell, Hamas 
53 Milton-Edwards, “Prepared for power” 
54 Meshal, “We will not sell “; Butcher, “Hamas offers deal” 
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exploited its ballot box gains to entrench power against its rivals in Fatah. It remained 
sceptical that Hamas would abide by such an agreement when it failed to incorporate 
recognition of Israel and an agreement to fully cease from all violence and abide by previous 
Palestinian-Israeli agreements. It also refused to recognise the legitimacy of the Palestinian 
electoral victory visited on Hamas.55 Fatah, for its part, initially refused to work with Hamas. 
In November 2006 Hamas announced a further tahdiyah to limit violent attacks on Israel. 
The rationale of this move was questioned by Palestinians in the context of Hamas’s 
substantive discourse about resistance against Israel, the principles of jihad and the right to 
employ legitimate violence in defence from Israeli military attack. Furthermore, some 
argued that Hamas had become Israel’s security guarantor against attacks launched from 
Gaza.  
Hamas was soon embroiled in serious internecine conflict in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 
As inter-Palestinian violence flared the resort to localised ceasefire was a key mechanism 
which was employed by a variety of local actors, including Egyptian diplomats in Gaza, to try 
to halt and ultimately end Hamas-Fatah bloodshed. Local negotiators in Palestinian 
reconciliation committees along with others negotiated tahdiyah agreements between 
armed Palestinian factions. Yet the need for such a mechanism at a local level was obviated 
by the Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip in June 2007 and the rout of pro-Fatah and PA 
forces.56 Under Hamas’s complete control in Gaza the tahdiyah against Israel was 
maintained. 
By June 2008 it was announced that the Hamas leadership – through mediation by the 
Government of Egypt – had reached a new tahdiyah with Israel. The truce would begin with 
Gaza and then extend to the West Bank. In Cairo for discussions were Hamas hardliners 
Foreign Minister Mahmoud al-Zahar and Minister of the Interior Said Siam.57 The key 
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elements of this first time agreement with Israel were based on principles of reciprocation 
from Israel, Egyptian mediation and a graduated decline of violence from Hamas. Sending 
well-known hardliners to negotiate in Cairo was an important signal of internal unity in the 
Hamas leadership. Elements of Hamas-Israel reciprocation centred on a suspension of 
violence. According to Hamas leader Dr Zahar Israel agreed to “lift the blockade of the Gaza 
Strip and reopen all the crossing points”.58 Importantly the 2008 agreement also included a 
role for the mediator: Egypt. Egypt would not only undertake some guarantees as it related 
to crossing points under its control to Gaza but was committed to maintaining Palestinian 
factional dialogue and direct mediation with Israel. What was absent from the agreement, 
however, was a mechanism for monitoring and verifying the ceasefire or steps to tackle 
possible relapse to violence between the two sides.  
Hamas embarked on a campaign to sell the agreement. Leader Mushir al-Masri, argued that 
the tahdiyah had not compromised the movement in terms of its ideological position on 
jihad but had in fact created gains for Palestinians, particularly those suffering under the 
Israeli blockade of the Gaza Strip.  “It” [tahdiyah], argued al-Masri, “was according to our 
terms and not Israel.  We didn’t give into Israel’s terms on [Israeli hostage Gilad] Schalit, on 
weapons, on forcing factions, or on power consolidation”.59 Throughout the summer of 
2008, however, it was increasingly evident from Hamas discourse that it did not believe that 
Israel was keeping its side of the tahdiyah bargain. Chief among Hamas’s concerns was that 
Israel lift – rather than ease - its blockade on the population of the Gaza Strip. Israel’s 
blockade of Gaza would be an issue that Hamas would repeatedly prioritise in its 
subsequent ceasefire negotiations with Israel during the violent conflicts of 2008, 2012 and 
2014.60  Israel was reported to be dragging its feet with international aid agencies reporting 
to US diplomats that there was “little improvement in Gazans’ daily lives”.61  
In this respect the confidence building measures often considered necessary for a ceasefire 
to hold and to lead to negotiation between contesting parties to reduce or resolve conflict 
was considered insufficient by one of the armed parties. As the tahdiyah progressed 
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throughout 2008 differences within the Hamas leadership also emerged. Gaza leader Ghazi 
Hamad called the tahdiyah “dirty politics” but conceded that it had allowed Hamas to “jump 
into the political square in a very short time” but that the compromises that had been 
required of the movement had led to a “contradiction between resistance, politics and 
ideology”.62 Another Hamas leader put it more bluntly when he stated that despite the 
tahdiyah with Israel, “we [people in Gaza] are still struggling and suffering. There is a 
shortage of everything.” He further asserted that while the tahdiyah had led to a “drop in 
the number of funerals the real fruits of the ceasefire such as agriculture development, 
building materials, etc. have not materialised. They [people] don’t have faith in Israel and 
say it’s just a tactic”.63 Two months into the tahdiyah the UN reported that the number of 
goods allowed into Gaza by Israel had actually decreased (OCHA 2008). Despite some 
infringements the calm lasted until November 4 2008 when Israeli soldiers undertook an 
operation into Gaza and killed 6 Hamas members. The subsequent escalation led to Israel’s 
major attack on Gaza in Operation Cast Lead a month later.  
The ‘Warriors Break’ - Conflict amidst calm and ceasefires    
The subsequent Israeli attacks against Gaza in December 2008-January 2009 called 
Operation Cast Lead, in November 2012 called Operation Pillar of Defence and in July-
August 2014 during Operation Protective Edge, must be seen in the context of the failure of 
the tahdiyah from the perspective of both Israel and Hamas. Hamas propaganda had to ‘sell’ 
such pauses as tactical and were increasingly referred to affiliate publications as the 
“warriors break” declaring that the “Zionist occupation yields unanimously to a reciprocal 
tahdiyah”.64 Wagemakers argues that Hamas have been compelled to scale back on the 
demands it could win from Israel in return for a form of ceasefire.65  Hamas leaders such as 
Khaled Meshal began to articulate the tahdiyah explicitly in terms of Israel’s blockade of 
Gaza and as a tactical response, “[its ] a tactic in conflict management and a phase in the 
framework of the resistance,” continuing he said, “the tahdiya creates a step that will force 
Israel…to remove the siege…and if it happens it will be a remarkable achievement….We are 
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speaking of a tactical tahdiya… As long as there is occupation, there is no other way but 
resistance”.66  
The goal of durable ceasefire should have been regarded as a key component of conflict 
management and confidence building measures but it was not.67 Despite its obvious role in 
initiating, negotiating, observing and ensuring the enforcement of ceasefires Hamas were 
still perceived by Israel and its key allies, such as the US, as promoting its counter-agenda 
with a fundamental impulse to the violent destruction of Israel. The argument that Hamas 
utilising ceasefires as “breathing space to rearm before resuming violence with even greater 
intensity and loss of life than before” became a self-fulfilling prophesy.68 Hamas leaders had 
actually and repeatedly signalled otherwise. Hamas leaders appeared to be seeking the 
active intervention of mediators and monitors from the international community as a means 
of transitioning from conflict. As Hamas leader Usama Hamdan asserted “what we are 
seeking to have is a real ceasefire which can be guaranteed by the international community. 
It has to prevent Israel from attacking the Palestinians and at the same time open our 
borders, and permit the Palestinian people to have a normal life”.69 Here the case was being 
articulated by Hamas in relation to the demand for the end of the Israeli blockade which for 
8 years had collectively punished the entire population of the Gaza Strip.70 But it was one 
which its enemy and mediators to the conflict could not hear.71 Furthermore it was indeed 
all the more difficult to determine the intentions of the leadership of the movement when 
such ceasefires collapsed due to broader local and regional dynamics. It is important, 
therefore to recognise the contexts in which ceasefires broke down rather than assume 
causalities that might be less than clear.   
Throughout this period, as the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians collapsed, 
the region was rocked by the outbreak of the Arab Spring and the rise of extremist Islamist 
groups such as ISIS in Iraq and Syria it appeared that neither Hamas nor Israel had much 
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incentive to sue for a ceasefire of any substance and longevity.  It can be contended that 
each side has been making strategic calculations about the regional security environment 
and have been content to maintain the status quo. Additionally some mediators have 
exhibited a predisposition to accept the status quo in terms of security interests.  It is also 
clear that neither Israel nor Hamas have been perceived by their local supporter as having 
achieved ceasefires that have brought tangible benefits in terms of security, stability and 
confidence building measures. In 2014 more than 86% of Israelis were unhappy with the 
ceasefire agreement reached by their political leaders with Hamas.72 There is the contention 
that Israel was not serious about a reciprocated arrangement with Hamas. For example, the 
Israeli press has revealed that Israeli leaders had only agreed to the June 2008 tahdiyah in 
order to engage in military preparations for a strike against Gaza.73 Using a ceasefire for a 
pause appears to have been an Israeli tactic too. Hamas were also trapped and failed to 
understand that the kind of calm or ceasefire they were offering did not predispose other 
actors to build on such activities in terms of confidence building.  
Neither Israel nor Hamas has felt that they had ‘their’ kind of ceasefire. Israel equated a 
Hamas ceasefire with surrender and Hamas with victory over Israel. The drawbacks were 
obvious. On the other hand the unwillingness of Israel and the Obama administration to 
promote a rapid halt to hostilities and recognise important political conditions to maintain a 
ceasefire in Gaza were apparent during the 2014 Gaza war.74  This is explicable for a number 
of reasons. Firstly intra-Palestinian political frameworks, especially between Fatah and 
Hamas gave rise to forms of spoiler behaviours by Fatah whenever it perceived its rival as 
gaining ground over them domestically or externally, even with respect to cease-fires.75 
Fatah’s attempts at hegemony over the framework of peace-building and negotiation was 
perceived as essential in terms of its legitimacy among Palestinians and with foreign donors. 
Fatah were highly resistant to any attempts which would result in them becoming secondary 
actors. Secondly Israel’s approaches and actions around ceasefire-collapse, violence and 
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ceasefire making are highly problematic. In 2009, a study by Kanwisher et al concluded that 
contrary to popular perception in the Western media “it is overwhelmingly Israel that kills 
first after a pause in the conflict,” leading to Palestinian retaliation and ceasefire collapse.76 
Israel had opportunities to engage in mutual negotiation of ceasefires and had averred from 
reciprocation.77  
Moreover, with recent developments of reciprocation and mutual ceasefire negotiation 
mediated by Egypt the internal schism in Israel’s negotiating framework has again been 
exposed as tactical rather than substantive in terms of negotiating peace.78 In the 
protracted and complex mediation processes that began to lead to the ceasefire 
arrangements to which Hamas would agree to Israel’s belligerence was exposed. This is 
evidenced by the assertions of Israeli negotiator Gershon Baskin who alleged that Israel, in 
full knowledge that Hamas leaders, including the commander of the Izz-a-din al-Qassam 
Brigades Ahmad Ja’bari, had agreed a permanent ceasefire deal in November 2012, then 
assassinated the aforementioned Ja’bari sparking a further round of conflict in which 
Palestinian civilian casualties were significantly high.79   
By 2014, with the collapse of support for Hamas from important supporters in Egypt and 
elsewhere in the Arab world, Hamas were being manoeuvred to agree to Israel’s demands 
to end rocket attacks and maintain exclusion zones in what the UN refers to as a “buffer 
zone” between Israel and Gaza. Mediators with a history of engagement with Hamas – such 
as Qatar and Turkey were increasingly excluded from negotiation processes in favour of 
Egypt.80 Hamas compliance to Israeli demands was perceived evidence of its weakness 
which no amount of self-proclaimed victory rhetoric could cover.  Hamas continued to 
reiterate that no deals would be possible without a minimum of lifting the siege of Gaza, 
open borders, external monitoring of Israeli withdrawal and a cessation of all Israeli military 
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actions including the targeted assassinations of their own political and military leadership in 
Gaza and elsewhere. But the conflict in 2014 also exposed divisions in Hamas over ceasefire 
negotiations mediated in Cairo with commanders of the armed wing arguing against such 
discussions and in favour of prolongation of violence against Israel.81  
There were little by way of political opportunities for substantive negotiation or sustained 
confidence building measures created by such truces for either Israel or Hamas in terms of 
reducing enmity or ultimately preserving security for either side. Hamas, however, 
continues to attempt to capitalise on its position in the Palestinian political landscape in 
opposition to President Abbas and Fatah and refer to a ceasefire with Israel and a 
negotiation of it (involving a variety of diverse mediators) as an option.82 Resistance still 
remains on the agenda for Hamas alongside its claim to governance in Gaza and it still 
advocates for ceasefire terms. In 2009 and 2012 Hamas began planning for Gaza recovery 
and reconstruction before Israel’s operations had ended but in 2014 the scale of loss to 
Hamas and the citizens of the Gaza Strip have proved to be greater than its own capacity to 
rebuild and reconstruct. It has remained bounded by concerns within Gaza that were 
prevalent before the end of the tahdiyah and which the tahdiyah failed to deliver on for 
them. Hence the political dimensions of the recovery and reconstruction centres on: 
humanitarian assistance, an end to Israel’s siege regime, open borders and crossings, inter-
Palestinian rivalries and tensions, the relationship with Israel and the relationship with other 
external regional and international actors.83  
 
Amidst destruction Hamas’s self-declared victories have begun to have a hollow ring.  The 
ensuing periods of early-recovery and reconstruction have proved delicate and volatile in 
terms of the fractious political milieu that the cessation of violence had occurred in. Hamas 
has yielded much and this had been as a result of pressure on the movement from Gaza. 
Hamas has subsequently dedicated the energies of the organization to maintaining 
legitimacy in Gaza through attempting to steering the recovery and reconstruction process, 
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governance, indirect negotiations with Israel (via Egypt) and direct negotiations with 
PLO/Fatah/PA. Negotiations indirect or otherwise have failed to manifest long-term change.  
Hamas has used reconstruction funding issues rather than resistance claims to underscore 
its legitimacy in Gaza. For example, in 2009 Hamas’s Ismail Said Radwan stated that the 
movement’s priority was the establishment of a Higher Committee for Reconstruction. “The 
legitimate government and the national factions [in Gaza] will supervise the reconstruction 
project, in addition to Arab countries who are interested in helping out … We want aid to go 
to the people who deserve it”.84 In the wake of the war of 2014 that ambition for 
reconstruction was thwarted by the further degradation of Hamas’s, along with the citizens 
of Gaza, capacities as a national resistance organisation and governing movement. Hamas 
had also lost important Arab allies who were no longer as interested or whose energies and 
resources were diverted to other conflicts in the region.    
 
The prospect of Hamas and Israel negotiating a more permanent ceasefire has, since 2014, 
periodically been raised in public by both sides. There is little evidence, however, that the 
government of Netanyahu, has been willing to shoulder this initiative and thus engender 
support from its powerful allies. By 2016 the calm had largely been maintained but the 
precariousness of the status quo was recognised as no substitute for peace.  
Conclusion 
This article has demonstrated that despite numerous ceasefires and pauses a political 
settlement to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through negotiation which involves a key actor 
such as Hamas seems no nearer to resolution. Hamas has demonstrated that it is capable of 
engaging with the concepts of hudna and tahdiyah with demands from Israel that would, if 
adequately monitored and enforced be effective measures for confidence building. Hamas 
promotes these demands first and foremost as a localised Palestinian resistance 
organization that ‘competes’ with other Palestinian factions to claim the resistance for 
themselves and to frame and reframe it within some Islamist discourses – principally as it 
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relates to jihad. In this respect they differ little from other resistance or liberation groups in 
Columbia, Northern Ireland or the Basque region in terms of their rhetoric about resistance 
but their recognition that inclusion to a political process can be sought through a ceasefire.  
It is also clear that, unlike Columbia, Northern Ireland or the Basque region, the political 
actors with which Hamas contends with (such as Israel, the EU and the US) do not support 
or seek to utilise ceasefire as a mechanism for conflict resolution. This is because this would 
require such actors to dialogue with Hamas, negotiate with them and the admission of 
Hamas into a political or diplomatic process from which it has been firmly excluded.  
Hamas appears to have discovered early on that in relation to Israel resistance to a 
negotiated ceasefire and continued policies of aggression including targeted assassination 
means that it will not engage in the measures that Hamas requires from it in return for a 
cessation of violence. In this respect the framework of occupation and a desire to control 
and subdue the Palestinians and to degrade or even finish Hamas means that the limited 
goal of a ceasefire is often viewed as an unsatisfactory half measure, especially by some in 
Israel’s military and security institutions.85  Despite this Hamas has continued to embark on 
such measures and in large part this is explained by its desire to emerge as a significant if 
not the most significant Palestinian actor and to marginalise the hegemonic hold of Fatah 
and the PA in terms of power.  
Theological or Islamist discourse is not as significant in terms of Hamas’s calculations as its 
mobilising discourse and rhetoric. Does this mean that in some ways Hamas has 
acculturated to the nationalist environment in which it was established and still operates in? 
Certainly there is evidence of a dissonance between the rhetorical language of resistance 
(muqawama)/jihad and its decade-long participation in a variety of hudna and tahdiyah. If 
the evidence here is that Hamas acts as a political national movement then engaging it in 
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terms of reality rather than existential ideological threat holds out the slightest hope that 
the hudna could allow the movement to move beyond the “warrior’s break” or tactical 
pause.  The obstacle to such a course remains the framework for mediation, negotiation and 
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